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REFORMING 501(C)(3): PUTTING THE ―CHARITY‖ BACK IN
THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
Jennifer McCrabb Black*

I. INTRODUCTION
Charitable organizations have an important role in American society—
providing aid to the needy, giving homes to abandoned animals, and
contributing to the education and culture of our society.1 These benefits,
however, come at a price. Using the most recent estimates available, the
charitable contribution deduction2 costs taxpayers on average $57 billion
per year.3 This cost is presented as a ―tax expenditure,‖ which is defined as
―revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
liability.‖4 The cost of the charitable contribution deduction is estimated to
increase dramatically over the next several years. For example, the
charitable contribution deduction for 2009 is estimated to cost
approximately $5 billion for contributions to educational organizations, $5
billion for contributions to health organizations, and $47 billion for
contributions to all other organizations.5 These numbers are estimated to
increase to $7 billion each for contributions to educational and health

*

J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law, B.S., 2000, University of South Carolina. The
author is also a Certified Public Accountant.
1. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2009); Dean Pappas, Note, The Independent Sector and the
Tax Laws: Defining Charity in an Ideal Democracy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 461 (1991).
2. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
3. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 290 tbl.19-1 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/apers/receipts.pdf
[hereinafter
OMB
2009
BUDGET]; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2008-2012, at 56 tbl.2 (2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-08.pdf [hereinafter JCT
ESTIMATE]. The $57 billion figure was calculated adding the three charitable contribution deduction
line items per year and per report, calculating an average per year between the reports, and then
averaging all years the reports had in common together to come up with an average per year.
4. OMB 2009 BUDGET, supra note 3, at 287.
5. Id. at 290 tbl.19-1.
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organizations and almost $63 billion for contributions to all other
organizations by 2013.6
Despite this enormous cost to the public, there is little assurance that the
public is receiving adequate benefits in return.7 Although charities are
prohibited from benefiting private individuals or shareholders with their net
earnings,8 there is nothing that measures the actual public benefit a charity
provides and nothing to hold a charity to any public benefit threshold.9 A
solution is needed to ensure that only those organizations which are
providing a sufficient public benefit are receiving a portion of the $57
billion per year.10 The inefficient and uncharitable organizations need to be
weeded out to provide taxpayers with the most benefit for their tax dollar.
As the number of charitable organizations increase11 and the amount of
money donated to those organizations skyrockets,12 charity needs to be
redefined for tax deduction purposes. The redefinition will ensure that
taxpayers subsidize13 through tax-deductible donations only those entities
that are truly for the public benefit and not primarily for the benefit of a
small group of people.14
This paper seeks to lay out a proposal to redefine what it takes to receive
tax-deductible donations. Part II of this paper will summarize the current
state of the law as it applies to the charitable contribution deduction and the
qualification for tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code. Part III
discusses the Charities Act 2006, a recent British act aimed at attempting to
redefine charity for England and Wales by requiring organizations to prove

6. Id.
7. See Tiffany Keb, Comment, Redefining What it Means to Be Charitable: Raising the Bar with a
Public Benefit Requirement, 86 OR. L. REV. 865, 889–90 (2007).
8. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
9. See Keb, supra note 7, at 890–91.
10. See id. at 891; Pappas, supra note 1, at 481.
11. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, DATA BOOK 54 tbl.25 (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf [hereinafter IRS DATA BOOK].
12. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
13. Although there is much debate on whether tax exemption and tax deduction as related to charitable
organizations is a subsidy or a means to define the income base for tax purposes, the prevailing view,
and the view of the courts, is that they are subsidies. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (―Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that
is administered through the tax system.‖); Kenneth C. Halcom, Taxing God, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 729,
732 (2007). Bbut see, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by
Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV.
1057, 1067 (2008). However, even if it was a means to define the income tax base, arguably it would
not be base defining if the organization was not charitable and not providing sufficient public benefit. In
this case, the more reasoned view would be that the organizations were receiving a subsidy.
14. See Darryll K. Jones, Restating the Private Benefit Doctrine for a Brave New World, 1 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 33–34 (2003).
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that they provide a public benefit before receiving the benefits of being a
charity. 15 Part IV proposes additions and changes to the Internal Revenue
Code which, if implemented, would redefine the requirements for an
organization to receive tax-deductible contributions based on their ability to
provide for the public benefit. Finally, this paper concludes that change is
needed to ensure that only those organizations providing sufficient public
benefits are receiving tax-deductible contributions.
II. THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
The deduction for charitable contributions first appeared in 1917 as part
of the War Income Tax Revenue Act and covered contributions to entities
―organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals....‖16 Since its introduction, the charitable deduction has
expanded to include several additional entities and complexities. Although
many rationales have been offered to justify the tax exemption and the
corresponding ability to solicit tax deductable donations available to
eligible organizations,17 the primary reason is that these organizations are
supposed to be providing a public benefit.18
Under federal law, individuals and corporations are granted a deduction
on their income tax returns for ―charitable contributions‖ made during the
year.19 For tax purposes, a charitable contribution is defined to include a
contribution to an entity ―organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national
or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals,‖ provided the entity does not
engage in any prohibited behavior, such as political campaign intervention
or excessive lobbying.20 This language is identical to the language
contained in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), describing one class of organizations

15. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50 (Eng.).
16. Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 183, 203 (2004).
17. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 68 (2005)
(summarizing the various rationales).
18. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983).
19. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006).
20. Id. § 170(c)(2)(B)–(D); see also id. § 501(c)(3). Also included are gifts to fraternal organizations if
the gift is to be used exclusively for one of the purposes listed in I.R.C. section 170(c)(2)(B), excluding
sports competitions. Id. § 170(c)(4).
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exempt from tax.21 These organizations make up approximately ninety-four
percent of all organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible donations.22
Also included in the definition of ―charitable contributions‖ are gifts to
veterans‘ organizations or cemetery companies provided none of the net
earnings benefit a private shareholder or individual.23
Sections 501(c) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code list the
organizations which are exempt from federal tax.24 Section 501(c) includes
a list of twenty-eight subcategories of organizations that qualify for tax
exemption, including cemeteries, insurance trusts, and clubs organized for
pleasure.25 However, out of those twenty-eight subcategories, only those
organizations defined in four subsections of I.R.C. section 501(c) are
eligible to receive ―charitable contributions‖ as defined in I.R.C. section
170(c).26 Therefore, an organization may be exempt from tax, but unable to
solicit tax-deductible donations.
Organizations that are able to solicit tax-deductible donations have
restrictions placed on them that are inapplicable to many other tax-exempt
organizations. For example, section 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited
from participating in political campaigns for public office and from
spending a substantial amount of their activities attempting to influence
legislation.27 Also, none of the net earnings of any organization eligible to
receive tax-deductible donations may inure to the benefit of a private
individual or shareholder.28
Both I.R.C. section 170(c)(2)(B) (granting a tax deduction) and I.R.C.
section 501(c)(3) (granting tax exemption) list ―charitable‖ as only one of
the many types of organizations.29 ―Charitable,‖ for tax purposes, is not
defined solely as relief to the poor, which is its ordinary and popular
meaning.30 Instead, it is defined by its legal meaning, which includes not

21. Id. § 501(c)(3).
22. See IRS DATA BOOK, supra note 11. The ninety-four percent was calculated using the 2007
numbers which are the most recent available.
23. I.R.C. § 170(c)(3), (5) (2006).
24. Id. § 501(c)–(d).
25. Id. § 501(c).
26. See id. § 501(c)(3), (10), (13), (19); see also id. § 170(c). Contributions for public purposes to a
state, a possession of the United States, or a political subdivision of a state also qualify as charitable
contributions. Id. § 170(c)(2)(A). This type of charitable contribution will not be addressed by this
proposal.
27. Id. § 501(c)(3).
28. Id. § 170(c); see also id. § 501(c)(3), (10), (13), (19).
29. Id. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 501(c)(3).
30. See Borek, supra note 16, at 187; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2009) (defining
charitable using a legal definition).
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only relief to the poor but also things such as the advancement of religion,
education, and science, erection or maintenance of public structures,
lessening the burdens of government, and the promotion of social welfare.31
This definition is much more expansive than the ordinary definition and has
its origins in the English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601,32 which, until
recently, was the predominant source of the definition of charity.33
Furthermore, many organizations that qualify to receive tax-deductible
contributions, such as those organized for amateur sports or for the
prevention of cruelty to animals or children, are not included in the legal
definition of ―charitable,‖34 suggesting that a charitable contribution
deduction is allowed for organizations that are not charitable.
III. THE CHARITIES ACT 2006
After three years of debate, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the
Charities Act 2006 (―Charities Act‖) in November 2006 as the first major
legislative reform to the definition of charity in England and Wales since
the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601.35 The main purpose of this Act was
to require proof of an organization‘s public benefit before granting the
benefits of charitable status.36 Prior to the Charities Act, organizations that
were religious, educational, or for the relief of poverty were presumed to
provide a public benefit.37 Now, in order to be a charity in England and
Wales, an organization must be established for one of the thirteen purposes
listed in the statute and be for the public benefit.38 The Act does not define
public benefit, but instead requires the Charity Commission to issue a
guidance document to define the term.39 At the core of the public benefit
requirement, the Charity Commission has identified two key principles—
that there must be identifiable benefits and that those benefits must be to the
public or a section of the public.40 None of the listed purposes are

31. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2009).
32. See Borek, supra note 16, at 195–200.
33. See Keb, supra note 7, at 883.
34. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2009). Although the regulation is
promulgated for a different code section, the term ―charitable‖ has the same meaning in both. Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1983).
35. See Keb, supra note 7, at 882–83; see also Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 1 (Eng.) (applying to
England and Wales).
36. Stephen Cook, The Charities Act: Charity Law Finally Enters the Modern Age, THIRD SECTOR,
Nov. 22, 2006, at 18.
37. Keb, supra note 7, at 884.
38. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 2 (Eng.).
39. Id. § 4.
40. CHARITY COMM‘N, CHARITIES AND THE PUBLIC BENEFIT: THE CHARITY COMMISSION‘S GENERAL
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presumed to be for the public benefit.41 Religious and fee-charging
organizations expressed concerns over how the new requirement to prove
their public benefit would affect them.42 The Charity Commission recently
issued specific guidance for entities organized for the advancement of
religion or education, poverty relief, and fee-charging charities in addition
to general guidance for entities not in one of those specific areas.43
A. Religion and the Public Benefit
In order to be charitable, religion must be ―advanced,‖ meaning it must
―promote or maintain or practice it and increase belief in the supreme being
or entity that is the object or focus of the religion.‖44 Although this sounds
broad, the Charity Commission has cautioned that it is not enough that an
organization does something in the name of religion; it must advance
religion for the public benefit.45 In addition to providing concrete examples
of ways a religion can be advanced, such as missionary and outreach work,
raising awareness and understanding, and seeking new followers, the
Charity Commission sets out specific criteria that must be met in relation to
the two principles of public benefit.46 All organizations purporting to
advance religion must show that there is a moral or ethical framework
promoted by the religion.47 Although this may be an identifiable benefit of
a religion, it still must be sufficiently public in order to qualify as
charitable.48 For example, the public benefit requirement would not be met
if an organization was established solely for the benefit of the followers of
the religion.49 This does not mean that the organization may not restrict
access to its places of worship to followers of the religion, but the definition
of who may become a follower must be sufficiently open.50 This means

GUIDANCE
IN
PUBLIC
BENEFIT
7
(2008),
available
at
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/publicbenefittext.pdf.
41. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 3 (Eng.).
42. Cook, supra note 36.
43. See
Charity
Comm‘n,
Public
Benefit
Default,
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_essentials/Public_benefit/pbreligion.aspx
(providing links to the specific as well as general guidance).
44. CHARITY COMM‘N, THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION FOR THE PUBLIC BENEFIT 8 (2008), available
at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/pbreligiontext.pdf.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 11–18.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id. at 15.
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that closed religious orders that do not provide an opportunity for the public
to benefit would not be considered charitable.51
B. Fee-Charging and the Public Benefit
Fee-charging charities present a unique problem when assessing the
public benefit because they closely resemble for-profit entities that are not
charitable.52 To satisfy the public benefit requirement under the Charities
Act, a fee-charging organization must provide persons who cannot afford
the fees a sufficient opportunity to benefit in a material way, and that
benefit must be related to the charity‘s aims.53 The Charity Commission‘s
guidance on what constitutes an opportunity to benefit provides that entities
that offer a sufficient amount of free or subsidized access to people who
cannot afford the fees will satisfy the public benefit requirement.54 Feecharging organizations are not required to offer free or subsidized access,
but the organization must be able to clearly establish that the opportunity to
benefit is not unreasonably restricted by an inability to pay.55 Opportunities
to benefit that are not related to the charity‘s aims will not be considered in
assessing the public benefit.56
It has been suggested that a public benefit requirement similar to the
Charities Act be implemented in the United States in order to ensure that
charitable organizations are in fact providing a benefit to the public. 57
However, even though the Charities Act made great strides in the charity
law of England and Wales in requiring a public benefit to be recognized as
a charity, implementing it in the United States would not go far enough to
ensure that those organizations who receive a public subsidy in the form of
receiving tax-deductible donations provide enough of a public benefit to
justify the subsidy. What is needed is something more comprehensive with
brighter lines and more incentive for organizations to provide outreach in
order to receive tax-deductible donations.

51. Id. at 16.
52. See Keb, supra note 7, at 893.
53. CHARITY COMM‘N, PUBLIC BENEFIT AND FEE-CHARGING 5 (2008), available at http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/pbfeechatext.pdf.
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Keb, supra note 7, at 891.
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IV. PROPOSAL
Tax exemption is arguably a form of subsidy administered through the
tax system.58 However, if the federal government were to require all
currently tax-exempt organizations to prove their public benefit or lose their
tax exemption, there could be many constitutional problems that arise,
especially in the context of religious organizations.59 Therefore, only the
requirements for the types of organizations that can receive potentially taxdeductible donations to the donor should be modified.
A new subsection, I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i), should be added to require
all entities organized under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) to spend a minimum of
fifty percent of all tax-deductible donations received on ―charitable‖
endeavors.60 Then, the language of I.R.C. section 170(c)(2)-(5) should be
replaced with a new I.R.C. section 170(c)(2) that simply reads ―a qualified
charity organized under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).‖61 Alternatively, an
additional disqualification could be added to I.R.C. section 170(c)(2)(D)
which states ―or is not otherwise disqualified for failure to meet the
requirements of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i).‖62 This section will flesh out
the details of this proposal. First, this section provides a brief overview of
what the proposal will and will not affect. Second, details about the fifty
percent requirement and how it would be implemented will be discussed.
Third, the term ―charitable‖ for purposes of this proposal will be defined.
Finally, the practical effects of the proposal will be explored and the
miscellaneous provisions addressed.
A. Scope of the Proposal
The proposed change to I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) and the corresponding
changes to I.R.C. section 170(c) (the ―proposed statutory change‖) will only
affect which organizations are qualified to receive potentially tax-deductible
contributions from donors.63 Therefore, all organizations that currently
58. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); Lars G.
Gustafsson, “Lessening the Burdens of Government”: Formulating a Test for Uniformity and Rational
Federal Income Tax Subsidies, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 787, 788–89 (1997).
59. See Halcom, supra note 13, at 734 (arguing that under existing case law it would be unconstitutional
to impose an income tax on religious organizations).
60. The definition of ―charitable‖ for purposes of this proposal is different from the definition currently
used by the IRS. See infra Part III.C; see also I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2006).
61. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)–(5) (2006).
62. See id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
63. Deductions are only potentially deductible since an individual must itemize their deductions to
claim the charitable contribution deduction and may only deduct contributions up to fifty percent of their
adjusted gross income. See id. § 170(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
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qualify for tax exemption would still qualify for tax exemption under this
proposal.64 In the reverse, nothing in this proposal prevents Congress from
placing restrictions on the ability of any organization to be tax-exempt,
which would also affect an organization‘s ability to receive tax-deductible
donations.
The proposed statutory change would deny a charitable deduction to
veterans‘ organizations, cemetery companies, and fraternal organizations,65
unless the organization could qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. section
501(c)(3).66 This would require these organizations to conform to the
existing requirements of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), such as its restriction on
political campaign intervention and its limitations on lobbying, as well as
the new requirements under the proposed I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i).67
Although these would be new restrictions on these types of organizations,
consolidating all organizations that can receive tax-deductible donations
under one subsection and requiring them all to meet the same requirements
promotes equality and fairness.68
B. The Fifty Percent Requirement
The proposed statutory change would require all organizations that wish
to receive tax-deductible donations to spend a minimum of fifty percent of
those donations on ―charitable‖ endeavors (the ―fifty percent requirement‖).
By limiting the requirement to tax-deductible donations received, this
provides relief to fee-charging institutions, such as nonprofit hospitals and
colleges, which receive a substantial portion of their revenue from receipts
other than donations.69 This also ensures that only the subsidized funds are
subject to restriction. Since the proposed statutory change only concerns
the qualifications for tax deduction to the donor, donors should be permitted
to forego tax deductibility in order to exempt the organization from the fifty
percent requirement under the proposed I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i). This
would remove the subsidy on the funds and allow organizations to tailor
fundraising efforts with regard to non-itemizers who would not be losing
anything.70

64. See id. § 501 (2006).
65. Id. § 170(c)(3)–(5).
66. These organizations are currently tax-exempt under I.R.C. section 501(c)(10), (13), and (19),
respectively. Id. § 501(c)(10), (13), (19).
67. Id. § 501(c)(3).
68. But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546–48 (1983) (rejecting
the argument that all subsidized organizations must be treated equally).
69. See Keb, supra note 7, at 877–78.
70. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006 & Supp. I 2009); Borek, supra note 16, at 205 (discussing the period of five
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The fifty percent requirement would apply to the entity as a whole.
Therefore, an organization that receives donations in the form of restricted
funds—such as an endowment or donor-advised funds—would not be
required to spend the actual restricted donation in order to meet the fifty
percent requirement. Since the organization must meet the fifty percent
requirement at the entity level, it could use unrestricted funds to meet the
fifty percent requirement without disturbing the restricted funds.
Alternatively, endowments could be addressed by exempting them from
the fifty percent requirement and instead, requiring them to spend a
percentage of their annual expenditures on ―charitable‖ purposes. The
required percentage would be calculated by taking the total tax-deductible
donations contributed to the endowment as a percentage of the total
endowment and then applying the fifty percent requirement to that figure.71
For example, if the total endowment balance was $5,000 and it had received
a total of $4,000 in tax-deductible contributions over its existence, every
year the endowment would be required to spend forty percent of its
expenditures on ―charitable‖ purposes.72 To prevent the administrative
difficulties that would result if the required percentage was recalculated
each year for the next year, the required percentage should be recalculated
every five years. Of course, if this proposal were adopted, historical
records would make it hard to calculate the required percentage. Therefore,
a percentage based on the prior five years of the endowment should be used
as a starting point if historical records are inadequate. However, the intent
of the proposal is to treat all organizations equally and ensure that the
public receives ample benefit for the organization‘s ability to solicit taxdeductible contributions. Therefore, any special treatment for any type of
organization or fund should be carefully considered, especially since this
alternative for endowments does not require organizations to actually spend
from their endowment.73
Prior Supreme Court cases have struck down, as unconstitutional, laws
requiring that a percentage of funds received by a charity be spent on
charitable purposes before that charity is permitted to solicit donations.74

years in which the charitable deduction was available to non-itemizers).
71. This would result in a deferral between the time the tax-deductible contributions are received and
the requirement to spend them on charitable purposes. Therefore, a percentage higher than fifty percent
could be applied to endowments in this situation in order to offset some of that deferral.
72. $4,000 total tax-deductible contributions divided by the $5,000 total endowment balance equals
80%. 80% multiplied by 50% is 40%.
73. There have been proposals that would require colleges to spend a certain percentage of their
endowments each year. See, e.g., George F. Will, Willie Sutton Goes to Harvard, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2008, at A19.
74. See Sec‘y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 949–50 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v.
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However, these cases dealt with First Amendment issues and the ability to
solicit donations, not the tax treatment of those donations to individuals.75
This proposal does not limit an organization‘s ability to solicit donations,
but simply affects whether the donations will be tax-deductible to the
donor. This makes the proposal similar to the prohibition on campaign
intervention contained in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3),76 a violation of which
can also result in a loss of tax exemption under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) and
in contributions being non-deductible to donors.77 This prohibition has
been upheld as constitutional, so arguably this proposal would also be
constitutional.78 Furthermore, existing law already recognizes a distinction
between tax-exempt organizations and tax-exempt organizations that can
receive tax-deductible donations.79 Although this proposal would place
limits on an organization‘s ability to solicit tax-deductible donations, ―the
Constitution ‗does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.‘‖80
1. Reporting the Fifty Percent Requirement
All tax-exempt organizations are required to file an annual tax return on
Form 990 providing details on their receipts, expenses, assets, and even the
salaries paid to their employees.81 Religious organizations are exempt from
filing and disclosing this information.82 Form 990 already requires filers to
report their donations received separately, as well as divide their expenses
into program, management, and fundraising expenses.83 Furthermore, an
organization‘s Form 990 is available for public inspection, allowing
potential donors to evaluate an organization before making a contribution.84
This form could easily be modified to include a place to report the amount

Citizens for a Better Env‘t, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980).
75. See supra note 74.
76. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
77. Id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
78. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983); see also Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes Nat‘l Ministry, Inc. v.
United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856–57 (10th Cir. 1972).
79. See supra notes 24–26.
80. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
81. I.R.C. § 6033(a)–(b) (2006).
82. Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A).
83. See, e.g., I.R.S., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990: RETURN OF
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 29–37 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i990.pdf [hereinafter FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS]; I.R.S., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990:
RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX, OMB NO. 1545-0047, at 9–10 (2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [hereinafter FORM 990].
84. See supra note 83.

262

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:xiii

spent on ―charitable‖ items. This could be achieved by adding an additional
column to Form 990, Part IX ―Statement of Functional Expenses‖ for
charitable expenses.85 In the alternative, the columns for program,
management, and general expenses could be collapsed, resulting in the
same number of total columns—charitable, fundraising, and other expenses.
Which of the existing columns should remain for information purposes is a
policy decision that should be made, but that is immaterial for purposes of
this proposal. Organizations would continue to split their expenses between
the categories as provided in the instructions for Form 990, which only
requires that expenses be reported using ―any reasonable method of
allocation.‖86 For example, an organization could split an individual‘s
salary based on hours worked or on a reasonable estimation of the
percentage of time devoted to certain activities. In the case of free or
reduced services, the organization could allocate applicable costs based on
the total number of free or reduced cases compared to the total number of
cases.87
The proposal aims to treat all organizations eligible to receive taxdeductible donations the same. Therefore, the mandatory exceptions from
filing under I.R.C. section 6033 should be eliminated, and all organizations,
including religious ones, should be required to file the annual Form 990.88
Filing an annual return is the most effective way to ensure that
organizations meet the fifty percent requirement and promote the public
purpose of the charitable contribution deduction.89
Although the proposal would require religious organizations to file tax
returns, this would not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme
Court, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, held that
administrative and recordkeeping requirements may be imposed on
religious organizations without violating the Establishment Clause.90 The
administrative and recordkeeping requirements at issue involved the
imposition of sales tax on sales of non-religious materials in California.91
85. See FORM 990, supra note 83, at 10.
86. See FORM 990 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 33–37. This also provides guidance on how to split
indirect costs. Id.
87. For example, if a church provided day care to 100 children a year and of those 100, fifteen were free
and ten only paid 50% of the cost, the church could allocate 20% ((15 free + (50% x 10 reduced)) / 100
total) of the costs associated with the day care to ―charitable‖ expenses. This example assumes that the
free and reduced day care services are not provided to children of members or supporters of the church.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
88. See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2006).
89. See Werner Cohn, When the Constitution Fails on Church and State: Two Case Studies, 6 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 2 (2004).
90. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 393–95 (1990).
91. Id. at 381–82.
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Furthermore, the filing of an annual Form 990 would not result in more
entanglement than filing quarterly and annual payroll returns, which
religious organizations must file.92
2. Administrating the Fifty Percent Requirement
Requiring organizations to meet the fifty percent requirement on a yearby-year basis would result in administrative and economic inefficiencies.
Since Form 990 is filed on an annual basis,93 organizations would have to
reevaluate their status year-by-year and could be forced to make
economically inefficient decisions in order to meet the annual requirement.
For example, an organization may be forced to spend money in the current
year rather than saving it until the next year. These problems could be
eliminated by requiring the organization to meet the fifty percent
requirement over a five-year period.
Under the proposed I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i), regulations should be
promulgated that require the organization to meet the fifty percent
requirement on an aggregate five-year period (the ―five-year look-back
rule‖). This would allow organizations some flexibility in how they spend
donations and ease the administrative burden of determining if the
organization passes or fails each year. The five-year look-back rule is best
suited for regulations, because this would allow the Treasury to lengthen or
shorten the time period to best meet the intent of the proposal–that
organizations receiving tax-deductible donations spend the requisite amount
on ―charitable‖ works.
Under the proposed I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i), if any organization fails
to meet the fifty percent requirement under the five-year look-back rule,
that organization would be ineligible to receive tax-deductible donations.
The organization would cease to be tax-exempt under I.R.C. section
501(c)(3) and would instead be tax-exempt under another subsection, such
as I.R.C. section 501(c)(4).94 This is similar to the consequences an
organization faces for violating the prohibition on campaign intervention
under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3).95 The change from tax exemption under
I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) to tax exemption under another subsection would
be effective the year following the application of the five-year look-back
rule. The organization would also no longer be subject to the other
92. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 15-A: EMPLOYER‘S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX
GUIDE 9 (2010).
93. See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2006).
94. See id. § 501(c)(4).
95. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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restrictions contained in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), such as the restriction on
campaign intervention and the limitations on lobbying.96
Once an organization loses its status under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) it
should be permitted to reapply and receive tax exemption under I.R.C.
section 501(c)(3) again. However, to prevent I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) from
becoming a revolving door, regulations should be promulgated under the
proposed I.R.C. section 501(c)(3)(i) to set a waiting period for the
organizations wishing to reapply. The waiting period should range from
three to five years to provide some penalty, but nothing too harsh. In
considering whether to grant an organization‘s reapplication, the Internal
Revenue Service (―IRS‖) should consider all the factors, including, but not
limited to, the organization‘s actions during the waiting period and how
many times the organization has lost its status under I.R.C. section
501(c)(3). The IRS should not consider the fifty percent requirement in
determining whether or not to grant the organization‘s reapplication.
Now that the details of the proposal to change the requirements of the
charitable contribution deduction have been laid out, the next step is to
consider how an organization can meet those requirements. The proposal
requires a certain amount to be spent on ―charitable‖ endeavors. What is
charitable? Although many scholars have taken up the debate on what the
meaning of charitable should be,97 this proposal seeks to find a middle
ground between an expansive and narrow definition of the word—one that
will meet contemporary notions and public perceptions.
C. Defining Charity
The definition of charity has grown over time from its ordinary meaning
of relief to the poor to an expansive legal definition, which includes the
advancement of religion and science, as well as the erection and
maintenance of public buildings and lessening the burdens of government.98
Many scholars and courts have suggested new definitions of charity to meet
contemporary times or to narrow the list of organizations that qualify for
charitable benefits.99

96. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
97. See, e.g., Gustafsson, supra note 58, at 791–92; Keb, supra note 7, at 866–67.
98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2009); Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of “Charitable”
for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental
Assumptions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 587, 592–93 (1996).
99. See, e.g., Borek, supra note 16, at 208–11 (arguing that the definition should be limited to relief of
the poor); Gustafsson, supra note 98, at 602–18 (summarizing the historical evolution of the definition
of charity).
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1. The Many Definitions of Charity
There have been many definitions of ―charity‖ throughout the years, and
there are even many conflicting definitions today. For example, Webster‘s
Dictionary defines ―charity‖ to include relief for the poor and a ―gift for
public benevolent purposes.‖100 However, Black‘s Law Dictionary defines
it to include ―[a]id given to the poor, the suffering, or the general
community for religious, educational, economic, public-safety, or medical
purposes.‖101 Although similar, the latter definition is arguably much
broader than the former. This may represent the difference between the
ordinary and legal definition of the word.
Courts in the United States have also struggled to define ―charity‖ both
for tax exemption purposes and for purposes of charitable trusts. In the preincome tax case of Perin v. Carey, the Supreme Court held that, in the
context of a charitable bequest, ―a charity is a gift to a general public use,
which extends to the rich, as well as to the poor.‖102 More recently, the
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States defined charity by
stating that an organization, to be entitled to the tax benefits of being a
charity, ―must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established
public policy.‖103 Furthermore, the Court justified the tax benefits that
charities receive ―on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public
benefit.‖104 This ―public benefit‖ may advance the work already publicly
supported through the tax system but is not required to be one that society
chooses or is able to provide.105 The Court also held that the definition of
charity should be determined using contemporary standards.106 The
Charities Act is similar in that it defines a charity as an institution
established for one of the enumerated ―charitable purposes‖ so long as it
demonstrates a public benefit.107
Common in all these definitions of charity is the notion of a ―public
benefit.‖ Consequently, tax exemption has been denied where an
organization provides too much of a private benefit or too little of a public

100. WEBSTER‘S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 228 (9th ed. 1983).
101. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (8th ed. 2004).
102. 65 U.S. 465, 506 (1860).
103. 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). The Court also noted that although the categories listed in I.R.C.
section 501(c)(3) were presumptively charitable, they could not violate public policy and still qualify for
tax-exemption. Id. at 587 n.11.
104. Id. at 591.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 593 n.20.
107. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 1–2 (Eng.); see Part III (providing a more in depth discussion of the
Charities Act).
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benefit.108 Although it has been suggested that we should return to the
ordinary meaning of charity as opposed to the legal definition,109 arguably
this would not comport with the contemporary standard envisioned by the
Supreme Court110 and would exclude many organizations that provide a
public benefit from the definition of charity. This proposal seeks to find a
middle ground between these definitions of charity, while still maintaining
the spirit of the conflicting views.
2. The Proposed Definition of Charity
For purposes of the fifty percent requirement,111 the term ―charitable‖
should be defined as ―providing a public benefit or service to those outside
the membership or supporters of the organization.‖ This is similar to the
definition provided by the Supreme Court in Perin that ―a charity is a gift to
a general public use, which extends to the rich, as well as to the poor.‖ 112
This definition ensures that at least half of tax-deductible donations are used
to benefit the public, as opposed to allowing supporters of an organization
to receive a tax deduction for money that is ultimately used for their
benefit.113 In fact, from 1935 through 1940, regulations excluded funds
benefiting only the contributing members of those funds from the definition
of a charitable fund.114 The following examples demonstrate how this
definition would work in practice:115
a. Organization A is a nonprofit symphony that provides free or
reduced tickets to its members based on their level of contributions.
To qualify for tax-deductible contributions, including to the
members who contribute over the fair market value of the tickets
they receive, Organization A could provide free concerts that are
open to the public at large.
b. Organization B is a nonprofit hospital. In order to meet the
definition of charitable, Organization B could provide free or
108. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 597; see also Jones, supra note 14, at 11–12.
109. See Borek, supra note 16, at 222; Gustafsson, supra note 98, at 644.
110. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593 n.20.
111. See supra Part IV.B.
112. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 506 (1860).
113. See Jones, supra note 14, at 4–7. Professor Jones also proposes a very well-reasoned regulation
that deals with limiting the private benefit for purposes of tax-exemption. Id. at 25–30; see also Pappas,
supra note 1, at 461 n.3 (noting that some view churches as non-charitable because they are funded by
and serve a specific group of people).
114. Gustafsson, supra note 58, at 805–06.
115. See also CHARITY COMM‘N, PUBLIC BENEFIT AND FEE-CHARGING 12–14, 34–38 (2008), available
at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/pbfeechatext.pdf (giving some
examples for fee-charging organizations in England and Wales).
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reduced cost services to those who are unable to pay.
c. Organization C is a university that receives donations that are
both general and specific. For the general donations, Organization
C could provide scholarships (merit or need-based) or libraries that
are open to the public. For specific donations (ex. donations to
benefit the sports program), Organization C could provide
scholarships or open some games to the public at no charge. This
would be an example of an organization that has members or
supporters and the benefits that it provides could not be limited or
primarily directed at those supporters.
d. Organization D is a church that receives donations primarily
from its members. Organization D uses those donations to pay for
its pastor and utilities and provide other services, such as youth
groups and daycare. Since the people who are providing the
donations are also the ones benefiting from the services, in order to
qualify for tax-deductible donations, Organization D could provide
meals for those in need, open its facilities on cold nights to the
homeless, allow non-members to use their daycare services on the
same terms as members, or provide outreach to the sick or elderly
who are in nursing homes or hospitals, so long as these services are
not provided only to people who are also members or supporters of
the church.
These examples are not intended to illustrate the only ways that
organizations could spend for charitable endeavors; they are provided to
show how any organization could spend for charitable endeavors and
illustrate how an organization must go outside its circle of supporters in
order to qualify. However, as with the Charities Act, amounts spent by an
organization for charitable endeavors should be sufficiently related to the
organization‘s mission and similar to the benefits received by the members
or supporters of the organization.116 This notion of benefiting those outside
the organization is also consistent with I.R.C. section 274(a)(3) which
denies a tax deduction for club dues.117 Although this new definition of
charitable for the purpose of determining which organizations are eligible to
receive tax-deductible donations would have little effect on some
organizations, others would have to change their operations dramatically to
remain qualified.

116. See id. at 11.
117. I.R.C. § 274(a)(3) (2006). Arguably, at least some of these clubs would be tax-exempt. See id. §
501(c)(7).
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D. The Effect of the Proposal
By requiring organizations to spend fifty percent or more of the taxdeductible donations they receive on charitable activities, many
organizations currently able to solicit tax-deductible donations would be
unable to meet the requirement and, therefore, would lose that ability. The
fifty percent requirement would likely have the most effect on hospitals118
and organizations that are primarily self-supporting, such as churches with
little outreach. Although some organizations may argue that the fifty
percent requirement would spell their demise, since they are unable to offer
tax deductions in exchange for contributions, many people give regardless
of tax incentives, and many give who are currently unable to itemize.119
Further, the ability to solicit tax-deductible donations is not a right, but a
privilege.120 Under this proposal, an entity only has the possibility of losing
the tax deductibility of their contributions, not their tax exemption itself.
Tax exemption is a benefit that for-profit entities in the same or similar
lines of business do not have and places tax-exempt organizations at a
competitive advantage.121 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require
organizations to provide a measurable amount of public benefit before
receiving any more benefits.122
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
The proposed statutory change to I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) would not
modify the existing prohibition on campaign intervention (the
―electioneering ban‖) or the limitations on lobbying.123 If this proposal
were adopted, only I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) organizations would be eligible
to receive tax-deductible donations. Leaving the electioneering ban in place
ensures that the political speech of charities is not subsidized over other
organizations that do not receive a subsidy.124

118. See Keb, supra note 7, at 879 (explaining that some hospitals only give away one percent of their
gross revenues, do not advertise charitable care, and attempt to collect for charitable services). Although
under this proposal so long as the hospital spent fifty percent of its donated revenue, it would qualify,
nothing in this proposal prevents Congress from deciding to place restrictions on tax exemption, which
would affect an organization‘s ability to receive tax-deductible donations as well.
119. See Borek, supra note 16, at 221.
120. Gustafsson, supra note 58, at 831 (―Tax-exemption is not a right, but a privilege . . . .‖).
121. See id.; Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 428 (1997).
122. See Pappas, supra note 1, at 470.
123. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
124. See generally Sarah Hawkins, From Branch Ministries to Selma: Why the Internal Revenue
Service Should Strictly Enforce the § 501(c)(3) Prohibition Against Church Electioneering, 71 LAW &
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All organizations should be required to apply for tax-exempt status under
I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) if they wish to receive the benefits.125 Currently,
religious organizations are exempt from applying for tax-exempt status and
are automatically presumed to be qualified under I.R.C. section
501(c)(3).126 Requiring all organizations to apply for tax-exempt status
under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) ensures that all organizations are treated
equally and promotes accountability.127
Since an organization‘s ability to receive tax-deductible contributions
may change over time,128 an organization should be required to disclose to
donors their status at the time the contribution is solicited or received. Any
receipt given by the organization should contain this information as well.
Disclosure allows donors and potential donors to decide whether or not to
contribute to the organization and puts them on notice as to the potential tax
treatment of their donation. The disclosure could take many forms,
including verbal notification, a visible sign, or inclusion on any solicitation
materials provided by the organization.
V. CONCLUSION
Organizations should be required to spend a minimum of fifty percent of
the contributions they receive, which are not only tax-exempt but taxdeductible to the donor in ways that benefit the public which subsidizes
those tax benefits.129 Donations are similar to non-deductible gifts under
I.R.C. section 102,130 since they require a ―detached and disinterested
generosity‖ on the part of the donor giving to the organization.131 By
allowing a tax deduction for a gift to an entity, taxpayers are giving up
something and should receive something in return. This proposal requires

CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2008) (discussing the reasons why the electioneering ban should stay in place).
125. See Cook, supra note 36 (discussing how the Charities Act now requires all charities to register if
they are above the income threshold, including those previously exempt from registering).
126. I.R.C. § 508(c) (2006).
127. See Cohn, supra note 89.
128. See supra Part IV.B.2.
129. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (explaining that tax
exemption and tax deduction makes all other taxpayers indirect donors); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (stating that tax exemption and tax deductibility are
subsidies).
130. I.R.C. § 102 (2006).
131. See Comm‘r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Comm‘r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243,
246 (1956)).
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organizations to give back to the taxpayers who are providing them with tax
benefits in the form of spending for the public benefit.132
The proposal ensures that only the most efficient organizations are fully
subsidized through the tax system. An organization may provide a
worthwhile service, but due to inefficiencies be unable to meet the fifty
percent requirement. Just as desirable for-profit businesses may go out of
business due to inefficiencies, so too should the public not fully subsidize
through tax-deductible donations those organizations that are inefficient,
even if they perform a desired service.133 The fifty percent requirement also
cuts down on the potential for excess private benefits and subsidizing
private consumption through organizations.134
The benefits of this proposal would easily outweigh any cost to any
individual or group of organizations. With the national debt now in excess
of $10 trillion135 and with more spending on the horizon,136 tightening the
requirements for the charitable contribution deduction could result in more
tax revenues if organizations are unable to meet the requirements. More
importantly, the proposal would encourage outreach and more charitable
work by organizations that wish to keep their ability to receive taxdeductible donations. In this regard, the public and taxpayers are the
primary ones who benefit—through additional tax revenues available to
reduce the public debt and through increased outreach and benefits provided
to them by charitable organizations.

132. See Pappas, supra note 1, at 481, 507.
133. See Gustafsson, supra note 98, at 646–47.
134. See Pappas, supra note 1, at 481. For example, religion has been said to be inherently personal.
See Trebilcock v. Comm‘r, 64 T.C. 852, 854 (1975), aff’d 557 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1977).
135. See U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
136. See Joseph Williams, Obama Goes to Bat for Stimulus, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2009, at 6.

